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Abstract
The majority of allied casualties from recent conflicts were caused by blast wave and fragments perforation damage from Improvised Explosive
Devices. Survivability to this type of threat is a critical factor to consider for land platform design. This paper proposes an original approach to
platform survivability assessment using a combination ofAgent-Based (AB) simulation and Fault TreeAnalysis (FTA) to predict the consequences
of IED fragment impacts on the platform operational status. As a demonstration, this approach is applied to the comparison of different platform
architectures to gain insight into the optimisation of the platform component topology.
© 2016 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Ordnance Society. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Since 2001, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been
responsible for over 50% of the coalition soldiers’ deaths, and
IEDs dangerousness continues to intensify [1]. IEDs are made
of explosive material (typically discarded artillery ammunition)
connected to a triggering system. The explosion of such a
weapon generates blast wave (primary effect), fragments (sec-
ondary effect) and heat that interact with critical components or
crew to incapacitate a platform. The interaction may be direct or
indirect as in the case of Behind Armour Debris (BADs) gen-
erated by impacting fragments.
Add-on solutions that offer increased protection from IED
effects such as slat armour and anti-BAD liners exist, but
further benefit can be achieved through optimisation of the
platform architecture itself. Simulation tools are ideal for mod-
elling and testing architecture topology improvements as part of
the platform architecture design process. A wide range of vul-
nerability modelling and simulation tools are available, with
approaches that each provides a specific level of insight.
For example, war-gaming techniques provide exploitable
insights regarding platform usage doctrine while Finite Element
Analysis (FEA) provides detailed analysis of specific compo-
nent resistance to perforation.
This paper proposes an original approach to platform
damage assessment analysis that can be applied from the fleet
down to the component level, with benefits in terms of scalabil-
ity, modularity and reusability of the developed models. Among
other IED effects, this paper focuses mainly on the fragments’
impacts on structures but the application of the approach to
blast damage and shockwave transmission is also under study.
Platform crew is not particularly considered either, while the
method could be easily extended to human occupants, by con-
sidering appropriate fatality energy levels. As a demonstration
of the benefits of this approach a comparison of different future
platform architectures from their survivability to IED frag-
ments point of view is presented.
2. Background
An existing standard for description of system vulnerability
analysis is theVulnerability/Lethality (V/L) Taxonomy1 [2] rep-
resented in Fig. 1. Level 1 describes the initial state of the
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system before the attack. Level 2 describes the status of the
components after the attack, with regard to the damage criteria.
Level 3 describes the platform remaining capability at the func-
tions level while level 4 describes the platform mission remain-
ing effectiveness. Using a different terminology, the “platform
incapacitation process” described in Ref. [3] refers to the same
stages.
2.1. Threat/target interactions prediction
Three types of techniques are commonly used to predict the
effects of a given threat on systems:
1) Knowledge-based methods: this approach of survivabil-
ity assessment is based on human estimation of damage
resulting from empirical experiments or “after-action
reviews” of enemy contact. This knowledge can then be
implemented in “survivability tables” for simulation
wargames [4] or in a database for survivability assess-
ment expert-systems [5].
2) Analytical methods: in this approach, the physical reality
of the battlefield damage is described by mathematical
formulas. Mathematical equations are essentially corre-
lations with experimental data (e.g. THOR equations).
Semi-empirical equations are simplified models of physi-
cal phenomena [6]. Both empirical and semi-empirical
approaches are used extensively in vulnerability and
technical-operational studies [2]. Analytical methods are
usually coupled with target geometry ray-tracing analysis
to determine which parts of the system have been hit by
the threat [7].
3) Numerical methods: this approach uses subdivision to
model macro level problems using numerous small
domains (nodes) with individual solutions (Finite
Element Analysis). Then, numerical techniques are used
to find approximate solutions to each node. FEA provides
improved accuracy at the component level, but requires
detailed information about the structure to be modelled
and is computationally intensive [8].
2.2. Damage assessment criteria
As depicted in chapter 1, platform components (including
crew) can be damaged by different types of weapon effects.
This paper considers the damage due to Kinetic Energy (KE)
projectiles such as bullets and fragments. Possible metrics to
estimate the kill probability Pk of a component after damage
are reviewed in Ref. [9] (Table 1). As detailed information
regarding component kill probability is often classified, there is
little publically available data. Piecemeal information on criti-
cal levels of deposited energy was found in Refs. [10] (Table 2)
and [11] (Table 3). Some data about critical levels of impact
energy per area unit were found in Ref. [12] (Table 4).
2.3. Combat utility estimation
The ability of a vehicle to successfully perform its mission is
called the mission survivability [13], or combat utility [2]. It is
based on the different capabilities of the platform and its crew
Fig. 1. The V/L taxonomy.
Table 1
Possible metrics for kill criteria when a component is hit by KE projectiles of
fragments [9].
Metrics Possible kill criteria Pk
Number of hits Pk vs. number of hits. One special case is the “killed if
hit” criterion
Mass Pk vs. impact mass
Velocity Pk vs. impact velocity
Mass and velocity Pk vs. impact mass and velocity
Momentum Pk vs. impact momentum
Kinetic energy Pk vs. kinetic impact energy
Deposited energy Pk vs. deposited energy in the component
Penetration depth Pk vs. the actual penetration distance in the component
Penetration capacity Pk vs. the penetration capability of the penetrator,
regardless of the geometrical path in the component
Hole area Pk vs. the area of the created hole
Hole volume
Lost mass
Pk vs. the volume of the created hole or lost mass if
multiplied with the density of the material
Intensity Pk vs. impact energy or momentum per area unit
Table 2
Critical levels of deposited energy for components [10].
Critical
energy/J
Avionics 339
Pilot section 678
Engine 1356
Fuel tank 339
Remaining parts 1350
Table 3
Critical levels of deposited energy for platforms [11].
Fragment energy/kJ
Light damage
(Pk = 0.1)
Moderate damage
(Pk = 0.5)
Heavy damage
(Pk = 0.9)
Personnel 0.1 1 4
Aircraft 4 10 20
Armoured vehicle 10 500 1000
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which are typically categorised as mobility, firepower, C4ISR2
and protection. The combat utility of the platform is reduced if
any of these capabilities are lost or degraded due to damage to
the vehicle or crew (platform susceptibility3 and recoverability4
aspects are not considered here). So doing, most of the combat
utility prediction techniques are based on:
1) A list of individual equipment or subsystems critical to
the operation of the platform capabilities (Standard
Damage Assessment List).
2) The results of the criticality analysis, as a series of logic
diagrams that present the contribution of critical compo-
nents to the different platform capabilities.
There are three major formalisms for these logic diagrams,
which are illustrated in the simple example of Fig. 2.
1) Deactivation diagrams present the operational relation-
ship between critical components and each capability. As
long as an unbroken path can be traced through the
diagram, no platform capability has been lost [2].
2) Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) represent the critical
subsystems or components connected according to their
function or reliability relationship. They are “mission
success” oriented [14].
3) Fault Trees (FT) show which combinations of the com-
ponents failures will result in a system failure. It is com-
posed of a Top Event (TE) that represents the most
undesired event and lower level logical “AND” and “OR”
gates or Basic Events (BE) that define the combinations
of components failures leading to the occurrence of the
TE [15].
2.4. Existing work
While existing implementations of the Agent Based (AB)
approach for modelling battlefield complexity are numerous,
existing applications that assess vulnerability at the component
level are rare. In Ref. [16], anAB approach is used to model the
effect of an anti-tank projectile on an AFV. Provided results
generally concur with experimental data, but unfortunately no
information is given about component damage assessment and
no extension to the platform and fleet level vulnerability level is
described. A similar approach is used in Ref. [17] to model the
BAD generated by a missile explosion close to a military air-
craft fuselage. The focus is the relative accuracy of the BAD
modelling, but without considering the damage they create on
components.
3. Combat utility prediction methodology
In order to predict the impact of IED fragments on
platform combat utility, we use a combination of two tech-
niques (Fig. 3):
1) Agent-Based modelling is used to simulate the threat-
platform interactions, as agents are well adapted to model
battlefield complexity, meaning that with a large number
of elements in interaction. The “deposited energy crite-
ria” (chapter 0) is used to estimate the damage (probabili-
ties of kill) on individual components.
2) Probabilities of kill of individual components are used in
the platform combat utility Fault-Tree to determine how
the platform capabilities have been affected by the threat
and the probability to perform the mission.
3.1. Agent-Based modelling of the threat–target interactions
This approach uses agents to model the physical represen-
tation of objects such as IEDs, fragments and platform compo-
nents with a 3D space. In contrast to the existing attempts in this
2 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
3 The probability of being hit.
4 The probability of restoring mission capability through reconfiguration or
repair.
Table 4
Critical levels of energy per area unit [12].
Fragment impact energy density
40/(J·mm−2) 75/(J·mm−2) 150/(J·mm−2)
Rating Components that survive
are considered average
Components that survive are
considered to be at the objective level
It is not expected that any component
would survive a direct hit of this type.
Fig. 2. Examples of deactivation, RBD and FT diagrams of a DC power supply.
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domain, this work aims to generalise the AB approach to every
level of the battlefield (fleet down to component), with expected
improvements in terms of:
1) Abstraction range, from the component survivability
level up to the system of system survivability.
2) Arbitrary and appropriate level of fidelity from a common
approach.
3) Modularity, by favouring the development of ready-to-
use threats, components and platforms libraries.
Agent properties describe critical (in terms of the simulation)
dimensions of its existence. For example, at a given instant
a fragment agent is described by its position, mass and
velocity.
Internally the agents implement appropriate empirical and
semi-empirical methods to describe their behaviour and inter-
action with other agents. Four types of agents are used to
represent the problem (Fig. 4):
1) An IED agent models the threat and the characteristics of
the fragments that are generated by the explosion.
2) Fragment agents model all the fragments. Some of them
are going to impact the target.
3) Component agents represent the platform components,
with geometric and material characteristics attached.
4) Collision agents are used to detect the position and the
angle of incidences of fragment impacts on the platform
components.
3.1.1. IED agent model
Upon detonation the IED generates a number of Fragment
agents with initial parameters that depend on the IED charac-
teristics. For fragmentation, Mott’s formula (1) generates the
average fragment mass, considering the explosive and case
parameters, leading to consider a certain number of fragments.
Held’s formula (2) provides prediction of the distribution of
fragments size and mass, while Gurney’s formula (3) predicts
the initial velocity of fragments.
m B td
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⎠
⎟⎟⎟M
1
2 1 (1)
m : Average fragment mass (kg)
BM : Mott’s constant, e.g. 1.415 for TNT
t : IED body thickness (m)
di : Explosive diameter (m)
Fig. 3. Graphic illustration of the modelling approach.
Fig. 4. The way the 4 types of agents interact in the model.
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M n( ) : Cumulative fragments mass (kg)
m n( ) : Approximate mass of the n-th fragment (kg)
n : Fragments number, beginning with the heaviest.
M0 : Total mass of fragments (kg)
B : Empirical constant (≈10−2), function of const d t
λ : Empirical constant (≈2/3)
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V0 : Initial fragment velocity (m/s)
2E : Gurney constant for a given explosive (m/s), very close
to 1/3 of the explosive detonation velocity (e.g. 2.438 for
TNT).
M : IED body mass (kg)
Cexp : Explosive charge mass (kg)
k : 1/2 for cylindrical charges (e.g. artillery shells), 3/5 for
spherical charges (e.g. grenades).
3.1.2. Fragment agent model
Fragment agents emanate radially from the IED agent and
follow straight trajectories (gravity can be neglected for low-
mass/high-speed fragments). Fragment agent velocity is calcu-
lated from an initial velocity and transmission medium
(typically air) using the drag force equation (4).
V V
C S
m
lx
i
l e=
−
0
2
ρ
(4)
Vl : Velocity at distance l (m/s)
V0 : Initial velocity (m/s)
Cx : Experimental drag coefficient (0.6 to 2.07 function of the
fragment shape, 1.5 for cubic shape)
ρ : Air density (≈1.2 kg/m3)
S : Exposed area of fragment (m2)
l : Fragment distance to explosion (m)
mi : Fragment mass (kg)
Real experiments [18] have shown that initial velocity is
slightly different according to the fragment initial position
(Fig. 5) and projection angle (Fig. 6) because of the common
cylindrical shape of the IED casing, which would not be the
case for an ideal semi-spherical casing. But the consideration of
individual fragment initial position makes the equations much
more complex without significant benefits in terms of fidelity of
the prediction. For simplification reasons, this phenomenon is
not considered in the current research. So, the fragment velocity
is considered as uniform inside the solid angle of influence of
the IED (Fig. 6).
In the event of collision with a Collision agent, the Fragment
agent transmits some of its energy to the Collision agent
impacted and adapts its velocity andmass according to the result
of the collision computation, considering four possible
situations described in Table 5 and two fragment velocity
thresholds:
1) The ballistic limit velocity, under which the projectile
does not perforate the target,
2) The shattering limit velocity, over which the target shat-
ters into multiple Behind Armour Debris.
The ballistic limit velocity is approximated using the Brown
equation (5) from Ref. [2] while the shattering limit velocity
(Table 6) is based on experimental results related in Refs. [20]
and [21].
V ah mb cp =
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟
− 1
cosθ
γ
(5)
Vp : Perforation limit velocity (m.s−1)
h : Target thickness (cm)
m : Fragment mass (grams)
θ : Angle of impact (rad)
γ : Empirical constant (0.327 for RHA steel, −0.361 for Alu-
minium 2024)
a b c, , : Empirical constants of the target material (see Table 7)
Even though these four simplecasesglobally reflect thedifferent
mechanisms observed during projectile penetration [2], they do not
consider more complex phenomena (e.g. projectile erosion).
As mentioned in chapter 3, deposited energy is the criterion
used to estimate the damage to individual components. This is
Fig. 5. Variation of fragment initial velocity as a function of its initial position
for a 105 mm shell IED [18] and simplification considered in the current
research (blue plot).
Fig. 6. Example of fragment velocity versus projection angle for 105 mm and
155 mm shell IEDs [19] and estimation considered in the current research (blue
plot).
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calculated by considering the different distributions of the pro-
jectile kinetic energy detailed in Table 8.
In case of target material shattering (Fig. 7), the number of
generated BADs is estimated on the base of experimental data
[22] approximated by the empirical formula (6), assuming that
the BADs are all the same mass.
N
V V
V
=
−⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟12
0 085e S
S
. θ (6)
N : Total number of debris
θ : Angle of impact (degrees)
V : Fragment impact velocity (ms−1)
VS : Shatter limit velocity (850 ms−1 for Steel 1018, 1190 ms−1
for Aluminium 2024)
Table 5
The 4 impact situations considered.
Table 6
Shattering limit velocities according to different sources.
Target material Density [20] [21]
Steel 7.83 103 830 ms−1 1000 ms−1
Aluminium 2.71 103 1182 ms−1 1700 ms−1
Table 7
Empirical constants of the target material [2].
Target
fragment
Steel Aluminium
a b c a b c
Steel 1990 0.906 0.359 980 0.903 0.339
Tungsten 1210 0.906 0.359 613 0.903 0.339
Table 8
Distribution of the projectile kinetic energy versus different impact situations.
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Finally, BADs spray is characterized by a maximal angle
calculated in equation (7). Individual BAD velocity is calcu-
lated with equation (8) with angular deviation following a
Weibull distribution, according to Ref. [20] (Fig. 8).
θmax . .=
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟+72 9 10 7
V
C
i (7)
θmax : Maximum emission angle (deg)
Vi : Impact velocity (m.s−1)
C : Stress wave speed in target (m.s−1, 4.61.103 for steel)
V Vx θ θ( )= ( )L cos .1 92 (8)
Vx θ( ) : Velocity of the debris at angle θ (m.s−1)
VL : Fragment velocity after impact (m.s−1)
θ : Angle of debris with the normal (rad)
3.1.3. Component agent model
As a compromise between complex computation and the
targeted level of fidelity, components’ geometries are bounded
with Axis-Aligned Bounding Boxes (cuboids). For cylindrical
and complex-shaped components like wheels or pipes, this
approximation leads to slightly overestimate the probability of
a hit, which is not the case for other platform components, most
often cuboid. Components are also assumed to be hollow in
order to support typical platform nested components configu-
rations (Fig. 9). Hardness and thickness parameters are attached
to every component to calculate the fragment impact situation
as developed in chapter 3.1.2).
3.1.4. Collision agent model
Collisions between fragments and components are usually
detected using ray-tracing techniques [7,23]. In order to main-
tain the agent modelling approach of encapsulating functional-
ity and subsequent problem scalability, our approach uses
Collision agents which are generated at the surface of compo-
nent agents to detect impacts through efficient agent 3D prox-
imity algorithms. This approach allows the collision detection
resolution, and consequently the range of the combat utility
prediction, to be controlled by the number and size of collision
agents without changing the methodology (Fig. 10).
Fig. 7. Model of the BAD generation process.
Fig. 8. Direction of the BAD spray.
Fig. 9. Example of nested components configuration.
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3.2. Fault-Tree analysis
We use the Fault-Tree diagram formalism presented in
chapter 0 to model the system-under-study architecture (what-
ever level it is) and the way components contribute to every
capability of the system. The Top Event (TE) of the Fault Tree
diagram is the system mission failure, meaning the total loss of
the platform combat utility. Basic Events (BA) are represented
by the physical components of the system, using the same
breakdown developed in the agent-based model of the system.
So, there is direct correspondence between the Component
agents in the AB model and the Basic Events used in the FTA,
as illustrated in Fig. 11.
Probabilities individual component kills generated by the
AB model are used as failure rates for the Basic Events. During
the simulation and fragments impacts, failure rates are updated
and propagated through the system capabilities up to the top of
the Fault-Tree. Note that only static Fault-Tree mechanisms
have been implemented at this stage and so-doing sequential
relationships among component failures or components recov-
ery modes are not possible. Implementation of Dynamic Fault
Tree description has been identified as a possible future devel-
opment of the method.
4. Validation
While basic information regarding principles and technologies
developed to improve system survivability can be found in
open literature, defence system vulnerability information and
particularly experimental results remain highly restricted,
significantly complicating the validation of modelling and
simulation approaches. The approach used here is to partly
validate the models with piecemeal information available on
components vulnerability, and to compare the results obtained
at the component level with other available simulation
results.
For individual component vulnerability assessment, various
simulation runs of this model with varying projectile-threat
configurations have been conducted and analysed in Ref. [24].
Fig. 12 shows an example of such a configuration and results
obtained (angular dispersion of BADs).
A set of platform configurations has been tested for vulner-
ability in Ref. [24], with positive results. Fig. 13 is an example
of results obtained when exposing a simple platform to IED
fragments. Energy absorbed predictions match with the type of
damage reported in after-action feedbacks [1] and other mod-
elling methods [16].
Fig. 10. Different Collision agents (transparent boxes) according to the level of survivability analysis.
Fig. 11. Example of system breakdown into Component agents (left) and FTA basic events (right). Only the observation sub-system capability branch is developed
here.
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Validation is confirmed as the predicted energy accumulated
by individual components was comparable to those observed in
real world experiments, proving appropriate implementation of
the equations. Further validation requires that the high sensi-
tivity of the results to slight changes in the target parameters,
especially the shatter limit velocity of which estimation is
further investigated.
On the basis of these preliminary conclusions, further
investigations on more complex platform configurations were
conducted.
5. Implementation and results
The modelling approach is implemented in Anylogic soft-
ware and is applied to the assessment of the influence of plat-
form architecture modularity on mission survivability.
Initially, three different architecture concepts were defined,
on the basis of an original approach of platform modularity
(chapter 5.1). The Fault Tree Analysis of these architectures led
to preliminary conclusions about their respective intrinsic vul-
nerability (chapters 5.2.5, 5.3.5 and 5.4.5).
Fig. 12. Example of individual components configuration tested in [24] and results obtained (angular dispersion of BADs) compared to the reality.
Fig. 13. Example of platform configuration tested in [24] and results obtained. Dashed lines represent the critical absorbed energy levels leading to light damages,
from Tables 2 and 3.
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The architecture options were modelled using the approach
presented and were exposed to a HE105 M1 shell IED threat.
Predictions of combat utility resulting from numerous runs
were compared and analysed (chapter 5.5).
5.1. Platform modularity
A platform architecture intended for reconnaissance mission
(no offensive capabilities) is described in terms of three axes:
1) The mechanical architecture, of which roles are:
- To insure the contact of the platform with the ground,
providing suspension, power transmission, braking
and steering capabilities.
- To provide the mechanical mountings for every plat-
form component.
- To protect the platform inner components and crew
from external aggression.
2) The energy (or power) architecture, of which roles are:
- To generate the necessary electric energy for powering
the platform components.
- To distribute the electric energy in the platform.
- To transform the electric energy into the mechanical
energy required for motion.
3) The C4I (or vetronic) architecture, of which roles are:
- To support the data communications between the
UGV and its remote command and control station (e.g.
HF radio transmitter).
- To acquire all the information required by the
remote operation (e.g. driving camera) and by the
mission (e.g. tactical awareness camera mounted on a
turret).
- To process the information on-board to facilitate its
transmission or its interpretation by the distant UGV
operator (e.g. video compression software running on
an embedded computer).
- To support the exchange of data between the platform
components (e.g. CAN utility data bus).
A module is defined as a component of a larger system that
operates within this system independently from the operations
of the other components. Modularity is a set of properties that
support that independence of operations [25].
We make the assumption that an architecture design is purely
modular or purely monolithic, whereas in reality a more gradu-
ated degree of modularity is likely.
This leads to the definition of 23 = 8 possible designs
described in Table 9. Three architectures were selected for
further survivability investigations, as the most representative
of current design options for military land platforms:
1) The “monolithic” platform is the most common
architecture in low-range land systems: functions are
supported by unique and dedicated components that
cannot reconfigure. Some components support multiple
functions.
2) The “digitalised” platform represents the current trend in
land systems architectures. Digital networking of
components and intelligent power management allow
implementing redundancy mechanisms to improve the
system availability.
3) The “extreme modular” platform is an illustration of a
possible future modular platform, made of identical
modules that can re-arrange autonomously.
5.2. “Monolithic” platform concept
Most of the legacy low-range civil and military vehicles are
based on this design concept. It is also a usual type of design for
disposable UGVs as it is reliable and relatively not expensive to
produce (Fig. 14).
5.2.1. Mechanical architecture
The chassis is a solid case mostly made of rigidly assembled
parts. Optional parts such as the observation turret can be
temporarily mounted. In the implementation (Fig. 14), the
contact with ground is insured by a 2 × 3 wheel and rubber tyre
configuration. It is assumed that a damaged wheel is ripped off
the platform and does not hamper the remaining wheels.
Change of direction is affected by skid-steering. Steering is
therefore reliant upon two operational wheel trains.
5.2.2. Power architecture
Propulsion energy is provided by a single battery that sup-
plies the motors via a dual Motor Controller Unit (MCU). This
unit receives commands from the ECU via an I2C data link.
Two mechanical transmissions transmit motor torque to the left
and right side drive wheels. Another battery is used to supply
the C4I equipment (Fig. 15).
5.2.3. C4I architecture
A radio receiver unit receives control signals and in turn
sends command frames to the ECU. The ECU checks the integ-
rity of the frames and generates commands to be sent to the
appropriate equipment through dedicated point-to-point links.
Analogue images are acquired by the 2 cameras and com-
pressed by the ECU before being sent to the radio. Additional
sensor data (compass, GPS, battery charge) are formatted by
Fig. 14. Illustration of monolithic mechanical architecture with example of
existing implementation (Amstaff UGV-Israël).
Fig. 15. Illustration of the monolithic power architecture design.
455S. GABROVSEK et al. /Defence Technology 12 (2016) 446–463
the ECU and transmitted to the radio for communication to the
remote control station (Fig. 16).
5.2.4. Damage assessment Agent-Based model
As explained in chapter 3.1.3, platform components agents
geometries are modelled as cuboids. These cuboids are posi-
tioned in the 3D model according to their position in the plat-
form as shown in Fig. 17. Agent parameters are set according to
the different materials and thicknesses of components cases.
Components colours refer to the mechanical (grey), power (red)
and C4I architectures (blue) they belong to.
5.2.5. Combat utility Fault-Tree model
The least desirable event (Top Event) is the platform mission
withdrawal, which can result from mobility (propulsion/
Table 9
The same platform with various modularity considered. Architectures investigated are shaded in grey.
Fig. 16. Illustration of a monolithic C4I architecture design.
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steering), observation or communication function failures as
shown in Fig. 18. These intermediate events have been refined
down to the component level as explained in chapter 3.2.
Once the fault tree diagram of the system has been defined,
minimal cut sets can be used to understand the structural vul-
nerability of the system. Cut sets are defined as the unique
combinations of component failures that can cause the top-
event to occur. Specifically, a cut set is said to be a Minimal Cut
Set (MCS) when any basic event is removed from the set, the
remaining events are no longer a cut set. The minimal cut sets
can be seen as “critical paths” leading to the mission failure.
The order of the cut set is the length of the path that leads to the
undesirable event. So, the order of the MCS reflects the vulner-
ability of the whole system.
The results of the calculation of the MCS for the “Mono-
lithic” architecture are summarised in Table 10. An important
observation is that 8 single different components failures (cut
sets of order 1) lead to mission failure, which makes the mono-
lithic architecture intrinsically vulnerable to any damage to its
components.
5.3. “Digitalised” platform concept
The second design modelled is named “Digitalised Plat-
form”. Many current AFVs in development are based on this
architecture, and a lot of effort is focussed on the
standardisation of the mechanical, power and vetronics inter-
faces (NGVA, Victory [26]) with expected benefits in terms of
development, operation, maintenance and upgrade costs.
5.3.1. Mechanical architecture
The chassis is not fundamentally different from the mono-
lithic mechanical architecture. The only difference is the con-
sequence of the higher number of inner components that
significantly increases the volume of the body, offering a larger
apparent surface to fragments.
5.3.2. Power architecture
Two energy sources deliver electric energy required by the
platform components. The energy is produced and stored
on-board by micro-generators combined with batteries or fuel
cells. Power redundancy is provided through dual power cir-
cuits, providing a dual redundant supply for all equipment.
Power management for improved silent watch and intelligent
power balance can be realised by a dedicated computer (Energy
Management Unit) and monitoring capability in all electrical
consumers. Wheels are direct-driven by individual electric
motors which are controlled by individual control devices
(Fig. 19).
5.3.3. C4I architecture
The electronic architecture of the digitalised platform is
organised around 2 communications buses. The utility bus is
dedicated to the platform command and control while the mul-
timedia bus is dedicated to video data communications. Pos-
sible technologies for the utility bus are CAN and MilCAN
standards, while multimedia communications can be supported
by Gigabit Ethernet technology (Fig. 20).
Fig. 17. Geometry and position of Component agents in the damage assess-
ment model of the monolithic platform.
Fig. 18. Possible causes of the platform mission withdrawal (first level of the FT only).
Table 10
Minimal cut sets for the monolithic architecture platform.
N° Order Event Description
1 1 E002 R motor damaged
2 1 E008 Vetronics battery damaged
3 1 E006 Motors controller unit damaged
4 1 E007 Power battery damaged
5 1 E001 L transmission damaged
6 3 E003 FL wheel damaged
E004 ML wheel damaged
E005 RL wheel damaged
7 1 E009 R transmission damaged
8 3 E010 FR wheel damaged
E011 MR wheel damaged
E012 RR wheel damaged
9 1 E013 ECU damaged
10 2 E014 Observation camera damaged
E015 Driving camera damaged
11 1 E016 Radio transmitter damaged
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In a normal mode, control and command information is
received from the HF radio and transmitted to ECU1 and ECU2
through the utility bus. ECU1 and ECU2 operate in a parallel
redundancy mode. Command frames are decoded, integrity is
checked and appropriate data frames are sent to the motor
controllers to affect mobility according to command laws and
sensors feedback. The 2 digital cameras transmit compressed
video frames on the multimedia data bus to the ECUs and the
VHF radio transmitter (wireless video link).
If the HF radio transmitter gets damaged, control and
command frames can still be sent through the VHF radio trans-
mitter. If the VHF radio transmitter is damaged, low-data-rate
pictures can be sent after compression by the ECUs to the
remote station via the HF radio transmitter.
5.3.4. Damage assessment Agent-Based model
The assumption is made that the motor controllers are
mounted next to the motors they control. The space between
each pair of motors is used to install the computer units and the
batteries. The individual equipment size is the same as for the
monolithic architecture (Fig. 21).
5.3.5. Combat utility Fault-Tree model
The minimal cut sets (MCS) analysis yields the events
described in Table 11. The minimal cut sets order has been set
to 2 to limit the size of the table. The results provide the
following insights:
1) There is only one MCS event of order 1 (EMU damaged),
making the EMU component very critical in the
digitalised architecture.
2) The criticality of the mechanical components (no MCS ≤ 2)
has been transferred to the vetronic architecture.
3) Digital utility and multimedia networking support redun-
dancies between vetronic components (MCS = 2).
5.4. “Extreme modular” platform concept
This “extreme modular” platform architecture is made of
several modules that each provide a set common critical capa-
bilities. This means that they are able to re-arrange themselves
depending on the mission to realize and according to their
current operational status. Specialised sensors and actuators
can be mounted on the modules through a generic interface.
This is a futuristic architecture as the required technologies are
not all available yet. Some partial implementations exist
(Fig. 22).
5.4.1. Mechanical architecture
The platform chassis is made of identical modules that
mount together with quick link interfaces. These modules can
be arranged before the mission according to different configu-
rations, or they can replace each other dynamically in case of
module failure. Links between modules can be rigid or flexible,
acting as articulations or dampers.
5.4.2. Power architecture
Each module is able to provide its own energy as well as
energy to adjacent modules if required regardless of module
organisation. Power transmission between the modules is
insured by dedicated power plugs of different sides of the
module.
5.4.3. C4I architecture
All modules communicate via redundant data networks.
Connections with sensors and actuators mounted on modules
are insured by multiple pins connectors. In case of connector
damage, information and power are transmitted by remaining
operational sockets (Fig. 23).
Fig. 19. Illustration of the digitalised power architecture design.
Fig. 20. Illustration of a digitalised C4I architecture design.
Table 11
Minimal cut sets (limited to order 2) for the digitalised architecture platform.
N° Order Event Description
1 2 E001 Observation camera damaged
E002 Driving camera damaged
2 1 E007 EMU damaged
3 2 E008 Source 1 damaged
E009 Source 2 damaged
4 2 E005 HF transmitter damaged
E006 VHF transmitter damaged
5 2 E003 ECU1 damaged
E004 ECU2 damaged
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5.4.4. Damage assessment Agent-Based model
To be able to compare the survivability of the three archi-
tectures, equipment size must remain the same, as well as the
platform dimensions. Battery size is divided by the number of
modules to still have the same UGV range. A drawback of the
modularity is the multiplication of components and a particular
effort has to be put on the integration of these components into
the modules as shown in Fig. 24.
5.4.5. Combat utility Fault-Tree model
In the “extreme modular” architecture fault tree decomposi-
tion, we assume that the mechanical modules have been
configured before the mission and they cannot reconfigure in
response to damage. This ignores a substantial expected benefit
from this “extreme” modular architecture and highlights a limi-
tation of the static fault-tree analysis approach that does not
support sequential relationships among component failures.
Consequently, some additional assumptions had to be intro-
duced to simulate the re-configurability of the architecture:
1) Two batteries are enough to supply the rest of the archi-
tecture in energy in recovery mode, so that the mission
can still be completed,
2) A minimum of three wheels are necessary to preserve
mobility. We make the assumption that the modules can
reconfigure if the undamaged wheels are all on one side.
3) Two operational modules are enough to move and steer
the rest of the platform.
4) The observation camera is mounted on the top of one of
the modules while the driving video is always provided by
the front module camera.
5) One ECU and one radio can support the data processing
and communications for the whole platform in a recovery
mode.
Analysis revealed no MCS of order less than four (Table 12).
The modularity and reconfiguration capabilities of the platform
dictate that a minimum of four components (wheels) need to be
simultaneously damaged to foil the mission.
5.5. Combat utility prediction
The FTA of the three platform designs provides a means to
compare the intrinsic vulnerability of the architectures. As
expected, the “extreme modular” architecture is more resilient
to individual internal components failures.
Fig. 21. Geometry and position of Component agents in the damage assess-
ment model of the digitalised platform.
Fig. 22. Illustration of “extreme modular” architecture and example of existing
implementation (Roburoc UGV from Robosoft, France).
Fig. 23. Illustration of the “extreme modular” C4I and power architecture
design.
Fig. 24. Geometry and position of Component agents in the damage assess-
ment model of the “extreme modular” platform.
Table 12
Total number of MCS per order for the
“extreme modular” architecture.
Order Quantity
4 123
5 762
6 2
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Considering external threats, the MCS calculated
from FTA is not a sufficient reflection of the platform
survivability, as FTA does not consider the platform design
nor the way the platform components interact together to
reinforce (BADs generation) or to mitigate (shield effect) the
threat.
In order to get a more valid estimation of their relative
vulnerability to IEDs, we applied the combat utility assessment
approach described in chapter 3 to the three platform concepts
described in chapters 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. They were exposed to the
same representative IED threat (HE 105 M1 IED) in the con-
figuration of Fig. 25. Fig. 26 is a 3D view of the IED fragments
impacting the platform.
For each platform concept, a set of 50 simulation runs
(Monte-Carlo analysis) with the same target and threat
configuration and fragment Weibull angular distribution
resulted in the individual components kill probabilities pre-
sented in Figs. 27–29. Error brackets correspond to the standard
deviation for each probability of kill.
We can observe that:
1) The most impacted parts are the left wheels and the
motors driver modules (~50% of kill probability), as they
are the most exposed to fragments.
2) Predictions of the wheels kill probabilities do not vary in
the three platform concepts, as the same components are
used.
The real-time injection of these individual probabilities of
kill in every architecture fault-tree (see Fig. 30) provides addi-
tional results regarding the robustness of the architectures to
individual components failures.
Fig. 31 synthesizes the capabilities and combat utility pre-
dictions for the three concepts under study.
It can be observed that:
1) The “extreme modular” architecture is three times less
vulnerable to the IED fragments than the “monolithic”
architecture in terms of damage causing mission failure,
highlighting the potential of modular architecture design
for survivability.
2) The mobility capability is the most sensitive to the
IED fragments for all architecture concepts, indicating
that particular effort should be placed on the
design of this function, in this particular IED-threat
configuration
Fig. 25. Top view of the target-threat (“extreme modular”) configuration at
t = to + 2.6 ms.
Fig. 26. Example of 3D view of the IED fragments impacts on the “monolithic” architecture at t = to + 11.5 ms. Penetrating collisions are coloured in red, BAD
impacts are coloured in orange.
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6. Conclusion and future work
IEDs will remain one of the most lethal threats to future land
engagements while existing defensive aids are not sufficient
enough to fully protect the vehicle, crew and equipment. Mean-
while, the optimisation of the internal platform design remains
a critical factor in limiting the impact of IEDs effects on the
platform combat utility.
The modelling and simulation approach described in this
paper first aims to predict the damage caused by primary and
secondary fragments impacts on internal platform components.
This Agent-Based method has been validated on elementary
plates by comparison with existing experimental results or
other simulation techniques predictions.
In a second step and as a demonstration, the approach was
applied to the comparison of combat utility of three represen-
tative types of platform designs, by injecting component
damage into the fault-tree diagrams of the architectures.
In this case, results obtained show the benefit of modularity
(three timesmore survivable compared to the samplemonolithic
Fig. 27. Probabilities of the “monolithic” architecture components for being killed by IED fragments.
Fig. 28. Probabilities of the “digitalized” architecture components for being killed by IED fragments.
Fig. 29. Probabilities of the “extreme modular” architecture components for being killed by IED fragments.
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architecture) without considering dynamic reconfiguration
capabilities that are expected to further increase survivability.
This application also demonstrates the scalability, modular-
ity and reusability of the developed approaches to vulnerability
assessment. This approach enables the rapid generation of
quantitative results describing platform combat utility.
Future work will consider the thorough analysis of the vul-
nerability of modular platform, the modelling of IED blast
effect and shockwave damage due to components mechanical
interfaces as well as platform reconfiguration capabilities
through Dynamic Fault-Tree implementation in the modelling
environment.
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